Eliot Michaelson

I started off working on some core topics in the philosophy of language, like reference and indexicality. Then I turned to thinking about lying, deception, and obfuscation. More recently I've been thinking about how the devices we're now so often glued to have changed the ways in which we can do things with words. Along the way, I've also done work on fake news, shilling, speech acts, moral realism, abilities, colors, Frege, and the ethics of eating animals. For a more extensive overview of my work circa 2017, please see the interview I did in 3:16 Magazine.


Published and Forthcoming Papers

  1. What is the Proper Function of Language?, forthcoming in Inquiry [abstract].

  2. On Retweeting, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Applied Philosophy of Language (eds. Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore), Oxford University Press [abstract].

  3. On Amplification, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, forthcoming in Conversations Online (eds. Patrick Connolly, Sandy Goldberg, and Jennifer Saul), Oxford University Press [abstract].

  4. Unspeakable Names, forthcoming in Synthese [abstract].

  5. Reference Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2024 Edition. [abstract].

  6. Should Moral Intuitionism go Social?, with Marvin Backes and Matti Eklund, Noûs 57(4): 973-985 [abstract].

  7. The Vagaries of Reference, Ergo 9(52): 1433-1448 [abstract].

  8. Tolerating Sense Variation, with Mark Textor, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101(1): 182-196 [abstract].

  9. Speaker's Reference, Semantic Reference, Sneaky Reference, Mind & Language 37(5): 856-875, 2022 [abstract].

  10. Manipulative Machines, with Jessica Pepp, Rachel Sterken, and Matthew McKeever, in The Philosophy of Online Manipulation (eds. Fleur Jongepier and Michael Klenk), Routledge: 97-107, 2022 [abstract].

  11. Relevance-Based Knowledge Resistance, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, in Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments (eds. Åsa Wikforss and Jesper Strömbäck), Routledge: 106-127, 2022 [abstract].

  12. On Salience-Based Theories of Demonstratives, with Ethan Nowak, Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry (ed. Sophie Archer), Routledge: 70-88, 2022 [abstract].

  13. Meta-metasemantics, or The Quest for the One True Metasemantics, with Ethan Nowak, Philosophical Quarterly 72(1): 135-154, 2022 [abstract].

  14. Why We Should Keep Talking About Fake News, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, Inquiry 65(4): 471-487, 2022 [abstract].

  15. Who's Your Ideal Listener?, with Ethan Nowak, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99(2): 257-270, 2021 [abstract].

  16. Online Communication, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, The Philosopher's Magazine 94(3): 90-95, 2021 [abstract].

  17. Lying, Deception, and Epistemic Advantage, with Andreas Stokke, in The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language (eds. Justin Khoo and Rachel Sterken), Routledge: 109-124, 2021 [abstract].

  18. Daylight Savings: What an Answer to the Perceptual Variation Problem Cannot Be, with Jonathan Cohen, Philosophical Studies 178(3): 833-843, 2021 [abstract].

  19. The Big Shill, with Robert Simpson, Ratio 33(4): 269-280, 2020 [abstract].

  20. Discourse and Method, with Ethan Nowak, Linguistics & Philosophy 43(2): 119-138, 2020 [abstract].

  21. What's New About Fake News?, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16(2): 62-94, 2019 [abstract].

  22. Lying, Testimony, and Epistemic Vigilance, in The Oxford Handbook of Lying (ed. Jörg Meibauer), Oxford University Press: 214-228, 2018 [abstract].

  23. The Lies We Tell Each Other Together, in Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics (eds. Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke), Oxford University Press: 183-205, 2018 [abstract].

  24. Ethics for Fish, with Andrew Reisner, in The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics (eds. Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett), Oxford University Press: 189-206, 2018 [abstract].

  25. The Lying Test, Mind & Language 31(4): 470-499, 2016 [abstract].

  26. Doing Without Believing, with Michael Brownstein, Synthese 193(9): 2815-2836, 2016 [abstract].

  27. Act Consequentialism and Inefficacy, in Food, Ethics, and Society (eds. Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett), Oxford University Press: 210-214, 2016 [abstract].

  28. A Kantian Response to Futility Worries?, in Food, Ethics, and Society (eds. Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett), Oxford University Press: 215-218, 2016 [abstract].

  29. Shifty Characters, Philosophical Studies 167(3): 519-540, 2014 [abstract].

  30. Indexicality and the Answering Machine Paradox, with Jonathan Cohen, Philosophy Compass 8(6): 580-592, 2013 [abstract].

  31. Justice for Unicorns, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society 112(3): 351-360, 2012 [abstract].


Edited Volume

Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, co-edited with Andreas Stokke, Oxford University Press, 336pp, 2018.


Book Reviews

  1. Review of Shelly Kagan's How to Count Animals, more or less, The Philosophical Review 130(4): 601-605, 2021.

  2. Review of Alessandra Giorgi's About the Speaker, Mind 125(498): 562-565, 2016.

  3. Review of Jennifer Saul's Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, Journal of Moral Philosophy 13(4): 491-494, 2016.


Introductions

  1. Introduction to Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, with Andreas Stokke, in Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, Oxford University Press: 1-21, 2018.

  2. Introduction for Inquiry Symposium on Imagination and Convention, with Josh Armstrong, Inquiry, 59(2): 139-144, 2016.


Dissertation

This and That: A Theory of Reference for Names, Demonstratives, and Things in Between, UCLA [abstract].


Works in Progress

I have drafts kicking around on promising, consenting, insincerity, deference, domain restriction, color, meaning, and a few other things. If you'd like to see any of these, please feel free to email me.